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Abstract
Regulation of prescription and dispensing of antibiotics has a twin purpose: to
enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce inappropriate use of drugs. Nev-
ertheless, incentives on antibiotics to dispensing physicians may lead to ine¢ ciencies.
We model the interaction between competing physicians (with and without dispensing
of drugs) and patients exposed to bacterial infections when antibiotic treatment gen-
erates spatial consumption externalities. Then, we empirically investigate the impact
of dispensing practices on antibiotic consumption by means of combined spatial-lag
and spatial-error econometric estimators for panel data (SARAR). The investigation
exploits data from small geographic areas in a country where both regimes - with and
without dispensing physicians - are possible. We nd evidence that dispensing prac-
tices increase antibiotic use after controlling for determinants of demand and access, and
spatial e¤ects. This suggests that health authorities have a margin to adjust economic
incentives on dispensing practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
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1 Introduction
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are the two primary aspects of access to primary health
care. In most developed countries, the main role of family physicians is to prescribe drugs
without direct dispensing. Doctors are not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients
in several OECD countries such as Italy, Germany and Scandinavian countries. Still, di-
rect dispensing of drugs is possible within some countries. For instance, one Scottish region
(Highland) includes almost 20% of the total number of dispensing doctors in Scotland (Infor-
mation Services Division of the National Health System in Scotland, 2006). In Switzerland,
physicians are allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients in most cantons, with some
exceptions across the country.
The reason for separating drug prescribing and dispensing is to optimise drug treat-
ment by avoiding a conict of interest for the prescriber and by ensuring good practice
in dispensing (Trap and Hansen, 2003). Since dispensing physicians may have an incen-
tive to induce drug consumption in order to increase their revenues, it is suggested that a
regulatory policy that allows physicians to sell drugs directly to the patient may lead to sub-
optimal levels of drug consumption (Chou et al., 2003; Holloway, 2005; Morton-Jones and
Pringle, 1993; Nelson, 1987). Abood (1989) shows that dispensing doctors charge higher
retail prices, whereas Rischatsch and Trottmann (2009) suggest that dispensing physicians
have a greater probability of prescribing drugs that o¤er high margin, when compared with
non-dispensing physicians.
Nevertheless, the benets of separating drug prescribing and dispensing are still unclear.
Direct dispensing of drugs may increase patientsbenets because of improved access to
drug treatment in areas where geographical barriers represent a problem. Moreover, there
are important external e¤ects of consumption which a¤ect, in particular, the optimal use of
anti-infective drugs. Among these drugs, consumption externalities are certainly relevant
for antibiotics. These externalities can be summarized by the e¤ect of bacterial resistance,
which reduces antibiotic e¤ectiveness, and the e¤ect of infection prevention, which extends
benets from antibiotic use to other individuals (Rudholm, 2002). The recent literature on
antibiotic manufacturers suggests, for instance, that incentives for pharmaceutical rms to
minimise resistance are not optimal since companies enjoy a too short period of monopoly
benets from their antibiotic e¤ectiveness (Herrmann, 2010). As with respect to the re-
tailing market, the benets of good prescribing practices and low levels of resistance to
antibiotics generated by the separation of drug prescribing and dispensing must be weighed
2
against the costs of limited access and low levels of infection prevention.
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of practice regulation in enhancing
access to antibiotic treatment and in reducing inappropriate use of antibiotics. We rst
propose a theoretical model to investigate the behaviour of di¤erent types of general prac-
titioners in a competitive environment with imperfect information on the nature of patient
infections. The goal of the theoretical model is to provide some insights and hypothesis
on the prescribing behaviour of dispensing and not dispensing practices. For this reason
we propose a full theoretical model rather than a reduced form model that can be directly
estimated afterwards. The hypothesis derived by the theoretical model are then tested
empirically.
We apply an innite-periods horizontal product di¤erentiation model (Hotelling, 1929)
to the market for community antibiotic treatment by incorporating imperfect information
about the type of infection, diagnosis errors and alternative treatments under a fee-for-
service remuneration scheme for physicians. The market for outpatient antibiotic treatment
we have in mind applies, for instance, to Switzerland where doctors receive a consultation
fee which varies depending on the time allocated to the patient and the diagnostic tests
performed. In such a case, dispensing doctors may include additional costs for drugs avail-
able with them in stock and gain a margin on antibiotics sold to the patient. We show
that the interaction between imperfect information on the nature of a patients infection
and economic incentives to dispensing practices may increase the likelihood of antibiotic
prescriptions, ceteris paribus. The rationale is that self-dispensing physicians may increase
their revenue by selling more antibiotics under uncertainty on the nature of a patients
infection. To some extent, this e¤ect may overcome the opposite e¤ect of restrictions on
antibiotic use due to di¢ culties in access to health care treatment in areas where the density
of providers is relatively poor.
In the health economics literature, we are not aware of any theoretical approach to the
behaviour of dispensing practices that considers competition among physicians under un-
certainty on the nature of patients infection and spatial aspects of drug consumption. Two
studies (Liu et al., 2009; Rischatsch and Trottmann, 2009) investigate physician prescrib-
ing decisions in the choice between generic and brand-name drugs. Though, these studies
assume that physicians act as monopolists and spatial aspects are neglected. Recently,
Brekke, Holmas and Straume (2011) applied a vertical di¤erentiation model to analyze the
impact of regulation on prices and market shares of brand-names and generic drugs.
To investigate the impact of dispensing practices on outpatient antibiotic consumption
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empirically, we use a demand model which takes into account the main determinants of
antibiotic use. Moreover, we consider spatial aspects of consumption by means of an ap-
propriate econometric estimator. We exploit data from small geographical areas in a country
(Switzerland) where two regimes - prescribing physicians and dispensing physicians - are
possible, which provides the ground for a natural experiment. Related to this exercise is
the study by Windmeijer et al. (2006) who investigate the impact of promotional activities
by pharmaceutical companies on GP prescription behaviours. The authors suggest that
prescriptions are positively a¤ected by promotion expenditure but do not consider di¤er-
ent types of practices and focus on the market of anti-hyperthensives and anti-depressant.
Also, Trap and Hansen (2002) examine di¤erences in the rationality of the prescription in
relation to diagnosis and symptoms between dispensing and non dispensing doctors for one
antibiotic substance (cotrimoxazole). Since dispensing doctors are found to prescribe an
antibiotic 2.5 times more frequently than non dispensing doctors, the authors conclude that
dispensing practices may lead to increasing health hazards and bacterial resistance. The
authors do not account for access and consumption externalities.
Two previous empirical papers on the consumption of antibiotics relate to the current
study, primarily because they exploit the same dataset although they address di¤erent
research questions. Filippini et al. (2009a) investigate socioeconomic determinants of out-
patient antibiotics across small areas in Switzerland. However, this paper neglects the
prescribing behaviour of di¤erent types of practices, which is the focus of the present pa-
per. Filippini et al. (2009b) model the demand for di¤erent antibiotic classes used for
respiratory infections rather than the demand for total antibiotic consumption. The au-
thors investigate elasticities to socioeconomic determinants of consumption and own- and
cross-price elasticities between di¤erent groups of antibiotics.
Although one can hardly identify the socially optimal level of antibiotics empirically,
it is advisable to adjust for external e¤ects when investigating the behaviour of di¤erent
types of practices. Spatial aspects of consumption are generally disregarded in empirical
studies on drug prescription and consumption. Nonetheless, antibiotic drugs are generally
used to treat respiratory and gastrointestinal infections which are among the most common
infectious diseases acquired in the community. As discussed by Hess et al. (2002), these
infections are characterized by a spreading process across regions, i.e. the infection initiates
in one region and then spreads across other regions. As an example of the spatial spread
of an infection see, for instance, Werneck et al. (2002). Spatial-econometric estimators in
health economics have been recently applied by Lachaud (2007), Moscone et al. (2007),
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and Moscone and Tosetti (2010a, 2010b). Moscone et al. (2007) and Moscone and Tosetti
(2010a, 2010b) empirically investigate the determinants of regional health expenditures in
the US and in England using panel data. Both studies suggest the importance of taking
spatial aspects into account when modelling the utilization of health care services. We
are aware of only one study investigating spillover e¤ects of antibiotic consumption using
Italian regional data (González Ortiz and Masiero, 2013).
The remaining of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the model and
derive the equilibrium levels of antibiotic use for dispensing and non dispensing practices.
Section 3 empirically investigates the impact of dispensing practices on antibiotic use and
discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework: antibiotic treatment in general
practice
Our model of the market for antibiotic treatment provided by primary care physicians (GPs)
is an application of the standard Hotelling product di¤erentiation model (Hotelling, 1929;
Gravelle, 1999) in an innite-period framework. We incorporate new features, such as im-
perfect information about the nature of the infection, doctors diagnosis errors, alternative
types of treatment, and antibiotic consumption externalities. We focus on the interaction
between patients and general practitioners in an innite-period model when anti-infective
treatment is needed.1
At the beginning of each period, nature assigns a health problem (e. g. mild respiratory
or gastro-intestinal infection), i 2 fb; vg, to each of the 2 individuals uniformly distributed
along a unit line, where b is a bacterial infection and v represents a viral infection.2 Con-
sumers initially observe a symptom but cannot infer the type of infection they su¤er from.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that both types of infections are equally likely.
Hence, the probability of having a bacterial infection is p = p[i = b] = p[i = v]  1=2. Each
generation of consumers lives for two periods. Therefore, in each period there is a mass
of 2 consumers: a mass y composed of young consumers and a mass o composed of old
consumers. The proportion of young consumers entering the market and the proportion of
old consumers leaving the market in each period are the same, with y = o = . As an
1Anti-infective is a general term that encompasses antibacterials, antibiotics, antifungals, antiprotozoans
and antivirals. In this paper we focus on the choice between antibacterials and antivirals and the terms
antibacterials and antibiotics are used interchangeably.
2Dichotomous health problems are considered, for instance, in Jelovac (2001) where patients have the
same probability of su¤ering from a mild illness as well as from a severeone.
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exception, in the rst period there is only one generation of consumers, , and all of them
are young.
Individuals maximise their expected utility from consulting a doctor. In the market
there are 2 general practice rms (GP j, with j 2 [l; r]) of equal size, located at the two
extreme points of the distance. General practitioners can either be allowed to sell drugs
directly to their patients or not, depending on the legislative frame set by the health au-
thority. In the latter case patients need to purchase the prescribed drugs from a pharmacy,
which is located equidistantly from each practice, i.e. at d = 1=2.3
Patients choice of a doctor depends on the perceived level of diagnosis accuracy. Pa-
tients di¤er with respect to their location and the type of infection. Hence, a patient is
located at distance dl from practice l and at distance dr = 1   dl from practice r. The
di¤erentiation parameter d can either be interpreted as a geographical distance between
the individual and the provider location, it could be the distance between the individuals
preferences and the characteristics of the provider that maximises his utility.
Following patientschoice of a practice, doctors make prescriptions based on a diagnosis
signal. However, patients recover naturally from viral infections soon after a consultation.
The scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. This scenario applies, for instance, to mild respiratory
tract infections in the community, such as colds, rhynofaringites, mild pneumonia and otitis.
In these cases, a treatment undertaken using healing drugs, suitable for instance to reduce
body temperature (e.g. antipyretic or anti-inammatory), cough (e.g. syrup) or nose
constipation (e.g. spray), generally decreases the cost of illness because it o¤ers quicker
recovery and/or less discomfort. This type of treatment (NA) is usually prescribed and
is independent of any antibiotic treatment. Conversely, treatment with antibiotics (A) is
necessary to recover from a bacterial infection. However, antibiotics do not provide any
benet against viral infections. Since a doctors diagnosis may not be initially correct, a
second consultation is required later if the patient su¤ers from a bacterial infection and an
antibiotic was not previously prescribed.
2.1 Information structure
The accuracy of a GPs prescription is related to the level of diagnostic services provided.
We dene pcj 2 [0; 1] as the probability of a correct diagnosis by GP j. More diagnostic
services increase the probability of a correct diagnosis through the following simple rela-
3This implies that patients do not incur additional costs of transportation to buy drugs after a con-
sultation with a GP. Clearly, we also hypothesize that pharmacies are not allowed to change a doctors
prescription.
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tionship pcj(ej) = ej , where ej represents the level of diagnostic services provided by the
practice and  2 [0; 1] is a parameter. Consequently, the probability that the diagnosis is a
bacterial infection and an antibiotic is correctly prescribed is ppcj =
1
2ej . The probability
of mistaken diagnosis will then be 12(1   ej). We assume that doctors rely on diagnostic
tests to decide upon the type of treatment to be prescribed. Alternatively, we could assume
that doctors share the results of diagnostic tests with patients and cannot cheat on this
information.
Patients are imperfectly informed about the level of diagnostic services (ej) provided
by the practice. They assume that the level of diagnostic services is ej 2

emin; emax

,
with emin and emax equally likely. Consequently, patients expect an average level of services
e^j =
1
2e
min + 12e
max  e. We normalise ej to 1= and set emin = 0 and emax = 1=.
Patients are aware that higher intensity of diagnostic services increases the probability of
a correct prescription but dont know the true level of ej . They ask for a second consultation
if they do not recover within some time from the initial consultation.
2.2 Expected net benets of care
Primary health care services are covered by compulsory health insurance contracts and
patients pay only a small fraction () of the total cost of care. General practitioners are
paid under a pure fee-for-service scheme. The health care system we have in mind is akin
to the Swiss market for outpatient care. In this system, a consultation with a doctor is
usually characterized by a xed fee (f) plus the cost of any prescribed drugs. Treatment
with antipyretic/anti-inammatory drugs is assumed not to vary with the type of infection;
the cost of this treatment is set to zero. On the other hand, a course of treatment with
antibiotics has a xed cost of z (z < f). In Switzerland, patients copayments depends upon
the type of insurance plan chosen since di¤erent deductible schemes are available. However,
to simplify the analysis, we assume that the level of patients cost sharing does not vary
across patients.
Patients incur distance costs tdj to purchase services from provider j, where t is the unit
cost of distance. We summarise the costs implied by alternative treatments conditional upon
the type of infection in Table 1. A treatment without antibiotics is denoted by NA. For
instance, consider a patient with a viral infection consulting doctor j. If the GP decides to
prescribe an antipyretic/anti-inammatory without an antibiotic, the total cost of treatment
includes the partial cost of a consultation (f), plus the cost of distance (tdj). This gives
f+ tdj in the rst row of Table 1. However, if the GP makes a wrong diagnosis, the cost
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of treatment increases by z since an antibiotic is prescribed (second row of Table 1). The
total cost will then be  (f + z)+ tdj .
A fully recovered patient has utility uh > 0 dened in monetary terms. Consumers are
myopic in that only diagnosis e¤ort in the current period is considered. Using Table 1 we
can write the expected net benets from choosing doctor j as
u^j = u
h   1
2
e^j (f + tdj + tx)  1
2
e^j (f + z + tdj + tx)
 1
2
(1  e^j) (f + z + tdj + tx)  1
2
(1  e^j) (2f + z + 2tdj + 2tx)
= uh   1
2
[(3  e) (f + tdj + tx) + (2  e)z] . (1)
The terms inside the brackets of equation (1) indicate the costs of treatment when a
viral infection is correctly diagnosed (rst term), a bacterial infection is correctly diag-
nosed (second term), a viral infection is wrongly diagnosed and an antibiotic is prescribed
(third term), and a bacterial infection is wrongly diagnosed so that patients need a sec-
ond consultation (fourth term).4 Since patients purchase drugs from the pharmacy located
halfway from the two GP practices, patients bear the additional cost of distance tx, where
x =j xj xPHA j= 1=2 is the distance that patients need to travel from the chosen practice
j to the pharmacy (PHA). When patients need a second consultation because of wrong
diagnosis, the cost of distance to the pharmacy doubles (2tx). Finally, x = 0 when GP
practices are allowed to dispense drugs directly to the patients.
2.3 Demand for GP consultations by young patients
The structure of patientsinformation implies that a patients choice of practice is based
upon costly distance.5 Patients at distance dl  1=2 from GP l will prefer to consult GP l
instead of GP r. Similarly, patients with distance dl > 1=2 will choose GP r.
4Note that patients do not consider the possibility of switching to an alternative practice when a bacterial
infection is wrongly diagnosed. The fourth term of equation (1) indicates that patients consult the same
doctor twice if needed. This assumption seems plausible given the very short period between two sequential
consultations (see footnote 8 for further details). Many spatial papers (e.g. Brekke et al., 2010) neglect
switchings among rms when their implications are beyond the scope of the analysis. Also, patients are
assumed to be myopic in the sense that they maximise utility to recover from current infections only and
do not take future choices into account.
5Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007) assume that a proportion of patients is uninformed and
chooses a doctor according to distance. Gravelle and Masiero (2000) assume that patients observe practice
quality with an error and then learn by experience. These models focus on capitated systems rather than
fee-for service. Our assumption is useful to simplify the model and to focus on a patients alternative
strategies rather than the e¤ects of competition among providers. We then ignore the impact of a patients
information structure on the choice of practice.
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Doctor js initial demand for consultations by young patients in period t is then =2.
Note that one implicit assumption of this demand is that the market is always covered. This
requires that the expected net benets in (1) are positive for those patients located halfway
from the two practices, whatever the level of diagnosis accuracy. We then hypothesize that
uh is large enough to ensure u^(d = 1=2; e  0) > 0.6
Patients with a bacterial infection who receive a wrong diagnosis need an additional
consultation to switch to antibiotic treatment. These patients realise that the infection
has not been cured at some time after the rst consultation. All these patients have now
strong preference for antibiotic treatment. Total demand for consultations of GP l by
young consumers in each period is then derived by adding the number of patients who need
a second consultation to the initial number of consultations:7
Dylt(elt) =

2

1 +
1
2
(1  elt)

, (2)
where 12 (1  elt) is the proportion of patients with a bacterial infection who need a second
consultation because of wrong diagnosis. Similarly, we can write the demand for GP r as
Dyrt(ert) =  [1 + (1  ert)=2] =2.
2.4 Prevention and bacterial resistance externalities
At the beginning of each period, nature assigns a health problem to old patients in the mar-
ket, like for young patients. However, old patients present a lower probability of infection
because they have been exposed to antibiotics prescribed in the previous period. As a con-
sequence, they benet from the preventive e¤ect of antibiotic use (Ellison and Hellerstein,
1999). We assume that the number of old patients with an infection decreases by a propor-
tion  2 [0; 1] of the number of young patients (now the old patients) receiving antibiotics
in the previous period (from both practices). This can be derived from (2) considering that
only half of the initial number of consultations by young patients from each GP lead even-
tually to an antibiotic prescription and some of the young patients also receive antibiotics
because of wrong diagnosis. The number of young patients receiving antibiotics from both
6The assumption is quite realistic for the Swiss market for primary care, where the costs of access in
rural areas are not such as to exclude some individuals from receiving antibiotic treatment. Even though the
costs of access may generate some delay in receiving prompt treatment, individuals with bacterial infections
must consult a general practitioner to purchase antibiotics and recover.
7Patients may be disappointed because of health complications or loss of revenue due to antibiotic
treatment delay. However, dissatisfaction does not lead patients to switch practices. The rationale is that
patients are still sick and now expect to receive antibiotic treatment from any practice. Consequently,
expected utility from any practice is the same and switching costs associated to time and trouble to leave a
doctor and nd another are higher than zero.
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practices in the previous period isDAyt 1(elt 1; ert 1) = D
Ay
lt 1+D
Ay
rt 1 = D
y
lt 1+D
y
rt 1 =2.8
Consequently, a proportion of individuals DAyt 1 is healthy in the second period and does
not need to consult a doctor.
Total demand for consultations for GP l in each period t can then be written by summing
up the demand for consultations by young and old patients as
Dlt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) = D
y
lt +


2
  DAyt 1

1 +
1
2
(1  elt)

: (3)
The term 12 (1  elt) within the squared brackets in (3) is the fraction of old patients with
a bacterial infection who need a second consultation because of wrong diagnosis. Note that
diagnosis e¤ort in period t  1 a¤ects demand in the following period through Dylt 1. Total
second-period demand for GP r can be derived similarly as above.
Note that dissatisfaction with antibiotic treatment delay does not lead patients to switch
practices when old. Patients switching to alternative practices because of dissatisfaction is
not an issue in our model. This seems plausible given the set of information available to
the patient. Patients can hardly disentangle whether antibiotic treatment delay was due to
a wrong diagnosis or to the need to avoid unnecessary treatment and bacterial resistance.
Under uncertainty, practitioners can easily argue that their initial prescription was the most
appropriate. Hence, we focus on the impact of key features of antibiotic consumption, i.e.
externalities due to prevention and bacterial resistance.
The use of antibiotics in period t  1 reduces the e¤ectiveness of antibiotic treatment in
the following period because bacterial resistance causes a negative externality. We capture
this e¤ect by assuming that practices face increasing costs to cure patients with resistant
bacteria. Bacterial resistance a¤ects antibiotic e¤ectiveness in the following period and
depends on patients previously treated with antibiotics. We summarise the total costs
of bacterial resistance for GP l as DAyt 1 = 
 
Dylt 1 +D
y
rt 1   =2

, where  is the cost
generated by each young patient treated with antibiotics in the previous period.9
8Adding the number of patients with a viral infection who receive an antibiotic because of wrong diagnosis,

2
1
2
(1  ejt 1), to the total number of young patients with a bacterial infection, =2, we get (Dyjt 1  =4).
Considering both GPs, l and r, the total number of young patients receiving antibiotics is then (Dylt 1  
=4) + (Dyrt 1   =4).
9The parameter  can also be interpreted as the value of providing good care to patients. Indeed, better
diagnostic services in t   1 reduce inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions and, consequently, reduce future
risks for patients.
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2.5 The physicians objective function
The general practitioner has an objective function which depends upon the benets and
costs of diagnostic services provided in each period and the costs generated by the re-
duced antibiotic e¤ectiveness due to bacterial resistance. Using (3) we can write GP ls
intertemporal prot at time t as
Vlt =
1X
t=k
t klt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) (4)
=
1X
t=k
t k
h
(f   c)Dlt(elt; elt 1; ert 1)  DAyt 1 (elt 1; ert 1)  e2lt
i
,
where  2 (0; 1] is the discount factor for future prots, c is the xed marginal cost of a
consultation (c < f) and  is the marginal cost of diagnostic services. Note that Dl1 = D
y
l1
since there are only young consumers in the market, and Dyl0 = 0.
Dispensing physicians may di¤er from other practitioners for at least two reasons. Doc-
tors may incur some costs when keeping drugs on stock. In this sense they are more similar
to a pharmacy than to non-dispensing practices. A shortage of stock implies risks in case
patients are unable to receive the required treatment when needed. On the other hand,
large stocks of drugs that have been hoarded increase the risk of getting closer to the expiry
date. Unsold drugs may imply some costs for the practice.
In Switzerland, dispensing physicians get a mark-up on drugs prescribed. Obviously,
dispensing doctors are subject to pressure from pharmaceutical companies to increase pre-
scriptions to the same extent as other doctors.10
We modify the objective function of the general practitioner dened by (4) to include
the expected costs and benets of self-dispensing as
V dlt =
1X
t=k
t k

(f   c)Dlt(elt; elt 1; ert 1) + (z   )DAlt (elt; elt 1; ert 1)+ (5)
 DAyt 1 (elt 1; ert 1)  e2lt
i
,
where DAlt = Dlt   (   DAyt 1)=2 is the number of antibiotic treatments in period t. The
number of antibiotic treatments sold is obtained by summing up the number of young and
old patients with a bacterial infection (correctly diagnosed) plus the number of individuals
with a viral infection with a wrong diagnosis, and the number of patients who require a
10Windmeijer et al. (2006) nd that GP prescription behaviour is a¤ected by pharmaceutical promotion
but the magnitude of this e¤ect is not assessed separately for dispensing and prescribing doctors.
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second consultation because a bacterial infection was not initially diagnosed.11 z is the unit
price of drugs dispensed to the patient and   z represents the unit cost of drugs on stock.
We simplify equations (4) and (5) by setting c = 0 and  = 0. This is a convenient
normalization to ease the discussion of the results in the following section without losing
any substance.
2.6 Market equilibrium and the e¤ect of dispensing practices
Practice rms can change their e¤ort strategies over time. They take their competitors
strategies as given and non-cooperatively maximize their prots by choosing the level of
diagnostic services. When choosing diagnosis e¤ort rms not only take into account the
e¤ects on their current period prots but also on their demand and costs (bacterial re-
sistance) in the following periods. This dependence needs to be taken into account when
solving the model for the equilibrium levels of diagnostic e¤orts. Prots in period t depends
upon diagnostic services in period t  1 by both GPs. Also, the value function represented
by the ow of all future prots depends on all future levels of diagnosis e¤ort. Conse-
quently, an equilibrium has to ensure that deviations from current period levels of e¤ort
in the future are not convenient. We require a perfect equilibrium, i.e. each GP selects
the diagnosis e¤ort that maximizes its intertemporal prot given the subsequent strategies
of the other GP and itself, whose strategies depend only on the payo¤-relevant history
(Maskin and Tirole, 1988). Our pair of reaction functions (Rl and Rr) form a Markov
perfect equilibrium if elt = Rl(ert 1) maximizes GP ls intertemporal prot at any time,
given ert 1 and assuming that GP l will move according to Rl, and the same holds for
GP r. To solve for a Markov perfect equilibrium, let V dl (er) be the present discounted
value of GP ls prots given that last period GP r played er and that from this time
forth both GPs play optimally, i.e. according to their Markov strategies, and let V dl (el) be
the present discounted value of GP ls prots given that last period GP l played el and
that hereafter both GPs play optimally. V dr (el) and V
d
r (er) are symmetric. Given that
GP js choice of ej is restricted to a bounded set, the following are necessary and su¢ -
cient conditions for the reaction and value functions to be consistent and correspond to
an equilibrium: V dl (er) = maxel

dl (el; er) + V
d
l (el)
	
= dl (Rl(er); er) + V
d
l (Rl(er)) and
V dl (el) = 
d
l (el; Rr(el)) + V
d
l (Rr(el)).
11From total demand for consultations, Dlt, we subtract the number of patients with a correct diagnosis
not treated with antibiotics. These are =4 young patients with viral infections and

=2  DAyt 1

=2 old
patients with viral infections.
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Because diagnosis e¤ort a¤ects prots in two subsequent periods and expected prots
are the sum of concave functions in elt, we can write the following rst-order conditions for
GP l - the dynamic reaction function - using (5) as:
@V dlt
@elt
=
@dlt(elt; e

lt 1; e

rt 1)
@elt
+ 
@dlt+1(e

lt+1; elt; ert)
@elt
(6)
= f
"
@Dlt
 
elt; e

lt 1; e

rt 1

@elt
+ 
@Dlt+1
 
elt+1; elt; ert

@elt
#
+
+ z
"
@DAlt
 
elt; e

lt 1; e

rt 1

@elt
+ 
@DAlt+1
 
elt+1; elt; ert

@elt
#
+
  @D
Ay
t (elt; ert)
@elt
  2elt = 0
and symmetrically for GP r.12 Substituting for @Dlt=@elt, @Dlt+1=@elt, @DAlt=@elt, @D
A
lt+1=@elt,
and @DAyt =@elt in (6) and solving for the level of diagnostic services assuming for simplicity
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Proposition 1 A symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in the level of diagnostic services
is dened by
el = e
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r =
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4  (f + z) +
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. (7)
As expected, the equilibrium level of diagnostic services decreases with the marginal cost
of e¤ort (). Diagnostic services may decrease or increase with the fee for the consultation
(f), depending on the magnitude of the prevention e¤ect of antibiotic consumption ().
Without positive externalities from antibiotic consumption ( = 0), the equilibrium level of
diagnostic services decreases with the fee for the consultation. This is because a higher fee
increases the marginal gains from consultations. Consequently, there are more incentives
to reduce the diagnosis e¤ort, which reduces diagnosis accuracy and increases the number
of consultations.
The impact of positive and negative externalities from antibiotic consumption deserve
some comments. Note that negative externalities caused by bacterial resistance () increase
12The second-order conditions are @V
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the equilibrium level of diagnostic services. If the cost of treating patients increases because
of resistant bacteria, a higher level of diagnostic services is required to reduce the number
of misdiagnosed viral infection and, consequently, the amount of antibiotic prescriptions
in previous periods. An increase in diagnosis accuracy lowers the amount of inappropriate
prescriptions that contribute to the generation of resistant bacteria. Note also that positive
externalities of antibiotic use that decrease the fraction of infected patients in period t+ 1
have a two-fold e¤ect. First,  decreases the demand for consultations in period t + 1.
As a consequence, a higher level of diagnostic services is required to reduce the number of
antibiotic prescriptions in period t that generate a negative e¤ect on doctors revenues in
period t + 1 (the numerator of equation (7)). But second, an increase in  also decreases
the fraction of misdiagnosed infections in period t+1, ceteris paribus, which leads to lower
prescriptions of antibiotics and reduced gains. To o¤set this e¤ect, doctors must reduce
their level of diagnosis accuracy (the denominator of equation (7)). Note, however, that
the marginal impact of  at the numerator of (7) is larger than the marginal impact at the
denominator. Hence, we have @e=@ > 0.
Dispensing practices have an e¤ect on the equilibrium level of diagnosis accuracy through
the price of drugs dispensed, measured by z. Note, however, that this e¤ect depends on
the magnitude of positive externalities from antibiotic consumption (), and the e¢ ciency
of services provided (), which a¤ects the denominator of (7). The result is not completely
straightforward. Dispensing practices generally reduce the equilibrium level of diagnostic
services as compared to not dispensing practices, provided that  < 2=3. The rationale is
that a reduced level of services increases the number of antibiotic prescriptions in period
t with relatively low impact on consultations in period t + 1 and, consequently, the gains
from antibiotic sales are higher. This e¤ect is magnied by the reduced incentive to pro-
vide accurate diagnosis (at the denominator of (7)) when there are gains from antibiotic
sales. However, this result may not hold with strong prevention e¤ects ( > 2=3) and low
e¢ ciency of diagnostic services ( ! 0). This is because the marginal impact of z at the
numerator (7) becomes positive and prevails over the e¤ect at the denominator.
Using the equilibrium level of diagnostic services in (7), we can derive the amount of
antibiotic prescriptions per patient. The total number of antibiotic treatments in equilib-
rium in period t is 2DAt = 2
h
Dt   (   DAyt 1 )=2
i
. Substituting for Dt and D
Ay
t 1 and
dividing by the total number of patients (2), we get the per capita antibiotic use as
a =

1  
2
e

1  + 
2
e

. (8)
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Whether or not dispensing practices lead to higher levels of antibiotic use compared to
not dispensing practices clearly depends upon the combined e¤ect of nancial incentives
from antibiotic sales and externalities from antibiotic consumption. With negligible preven-
tion e¤ects ( ! 0) antibiotic prescriptions per capita are higher for dispensing practices
as compared to not dispensing practices. Note that the second term between brackets of
equation (8) tends to 1, whereas the rst term increases since @e=@z > 0 when  ! 0.
Conversely, when prevention e¤ects are strong ( ! 1) the result is less straightforward.
Note that the rst and the second terms may move in opposite directions. Consequently,
the hypothesis that dispensing practices increase antibiotic consumption through a reduced
e¤ort in diagnostic services does not follow straightforwardly from our theoretical results
and will then be empirically investigated in the following section.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Econometric specication
To investigate further the impact of dispensing practices we now propose an empirical
approach that exploits panel data from a country with a fee-for-service remuneration scheme
for doctors and variations in the regime of dispensing drugs across the country. The e¤ects
of antibiotic consumption externalities are captured by means of a combined spatial-lag
and spatial error econometric approach. As mentioned in the Introduction section, the
goal of the theoretical model presented in Section 2 is to formulate some hypothesis on
the prescribing behaviour of the practice rather than to derive a reduced form model to be
directly estimated.
The theoretical framework (equation 7) suggests that the consumption of antibiotics
is inuenced by factors such as the price of antibiotics and the price of a consultation,
the nancial incentives attached to direct dispensing of drugs, and positive and negative
externalities of antibiotic consumption that also exhibit a spatial dimension. Moreover,
it is important to underline that the demand equation (8) has been derived for a market
characterised by individuals with homogeneous socioeconomic variables such as income,
age, and cultural factors.
The theoretical model may also suggest the need for some dynamic specication in
the econometric approach. However, data at our disposal cover a relatively short period
of time and the estimation of a dynamic model with spatial econometrics methods is not
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straightforward. For this reason, we focus on static models.14
We have Swiss quarterly data on antibiotic consumption for the year 2002, disaggre-
gated by 240 small geographic areas.15 Switzerland exhibits relatively low levels of antibiotic
consumption compared to neighbouring European countries. The number of dened daily
doses per 1000 inhabitants (DID) in 2002 is 32:05 in France, 24:38 in Italy, 13:76 in Ger-
many, 11:75 in Austria, and only 9:00 in Switzerland (Masiero et al., 2010; Filippini et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2, the country is characterized by high heterogene-
ity in consumption across small areas. Latin regions (French- and italian-speaking regions)
generally exhibit higher levels of antibiotic consumption as compared to German-speaking
regions.
To investigate the relationship between antibiotic consumption and dispensing practices
we adopt a representative consumer approach, namely for each area we dene the dependent
variable as the per capita antibiotic consumption. Further, the econometric specication
of the demand for antibiotics includes some socioeconomic variables that vary across the
areas.16
In order to estimate the impact of dispensing and not dispensing physicians on antibiotic
consumption, the empirical model includes variables representing the di¤erence in practice
styles and incentives attached to the possibility of direct dispensing of drugs. We use
a log-log functional form and, therefore, the estimated coe¢ cients can be interpreted as
elasticities.
We initially specify the following model:
lnDIDjt = 0 + 1 lnYjt + 2 lnPOP1jt + 3 lnPOP2jt + 4 lnPOP4jt (9)
+5 lnPOP5jt + 6 ln INFjt + 7 lnDPHYjt + 8 lnDPHAjt
+9 lnPAjt + 10 lnPCjt + 11DBORjt + 12DLATjt
+13DHOSjt + 14NODISPjt + 15DISP50jt + "jt:
14For a dynamic approach to antibiotic consumption we refer the reader to a recent paper by Filippini
and Masiero (2012).
15Switzerland is a federal state made of 26 cantons (states) with remarkable di¤erences in terms of orga-
nization of the health care system and health care policy. Generally, a canton is made up of between 10 and
20 small areas. The population varies between 4,980 and 125,275 inhabitants per area. Each area has at
least 4 pharmacies and/or drugstores. Direct dispensing is not allowed in some cantons like Geneva, Vaud,
Balle ville, Ticino and Aargau. In some areas of the other cantons direct dispensing is permitted.
16The literature on determinants of the demand for physicians services emphasises the role of socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the population and practice styles (Hunt-McCool et al., 1994; Carlsen and Grytten
1998; Grytten and Sorensen, 2003). More closely to antibiotics, the literature suggests that cultural aspects
may inuence the use of antibiotics. For instance, Italian children receive more courses of antibiotics than
Danish children (Resi et al. 2003; Thrane et al., 2003).
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DIDjt is the per capita outpatient antibiotic use in the jth market area (j = 1; ::; J) mea-
sured in dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants, and "jt is the usual error term that will
be specied later.17 DPHYjt and DPHAjt are respectively the density of physicians and
pharmacies in the area; and PAjt is the price of a dened daily dose of antibiotic and PCjt
represents the price of a standard consultation with a general practitioner dened at can-
tonal level and captured by the point values (weights) calculated for the reimbursement of
services provided by general practitioners in 2001.18 POPljt is the percentage of population
in the l age range and INFjt is the incidence of bacterial infections (campylobacter and
salmonella).19 The latter variable is a proxy for the probability of a correct diagnosis. We
do not have more precise information, for instance, on potential need. Diagnosis accuracy
improves when the incidence of bacterial infections is high since the probability to prescribe
an antibiotic when it is not needed is lower. In the empirical specication we use the average
incidence of bacterial infections calculated over the years 1999-2001.
Further, the model (9) considers some explanatory variables not explicitly dened in
the theoretical model (8). Yjt is the average income in the area; DBORjt, DLATjt, and
DHOSjt are dummy variables. The rst one captures any borderland e¤ect with neigh-
bouring countries. The second considers whether an area is characterised by Latin culture
(French- and Italian-speaking), or German culture. The third dummy accounts for at least
one hospital in the area.
In order to capture the presence of practices that can sell drugs directly to their patients,
we use two approaches. The rst approach is based on dummy variables and is specied in
equation (9). In this case, two dummy variables, NODISPjt and DISP50jt, are introduced
in the model to capture the impact of direct dispensing of drugs. NODISPjt takes value
equal to 1 if there are no dispensing practices in the area, 0 otherwise; DISP50jt takes value
equal to 1 if the proportion of dispensing practices in the area is greater than 50%. The
intermediate case where the proportion of dispensing practices is greater than 0 and lower
17Clearly, the model does not allow to disentagle the possible mismatch between antibiotic prescriptions,
antibiotic sales and antibiotic use since detailed data on these gures are not available. We assume patients
non-compliance to be a negligible factor.
18 In Switzerland, a detailed fee-for-service system with more than 4600 items is applied for the reimburse-
ment of health care providers. A given number of points is assigned to each type of service according to
time, complexity and facilities. The cantons apply di¤erent values to the basic point, which reects the
heterogeneity in the costs of services across the country. Therefore, the point value can be interpreted as a
proxy for the price of a consultation.
19These are the leading causes of gastrointestinal infections. Since data are not available at local level,
we use information at cantonal level.
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than 50% represents our benchmark.20 As for the second approach, we use a continuous
variable (DISPjt) that represents the rate of dispensing practice. Following this approach,
the two previous dummy variables, NODISPjt and DISP50jt, are substituted for DISPjt
in equation (9). Dispensing variables should capture the presence of a positive mark-up
on antibiotic prescriptions gained by dispensing practices as compared to not dispensing
practices.
In Figure 3 we show the proportion of dispensing practices in small areas across the
country. Note that the association between antibiotic consumption depicted in the previous
map 2 and the presence of dispensing practices does not appear as straightforward as
probably expected.
To check whether there is an interaction between GPs monopoly power and the inte-
gration of prescribing and dispensing, we also test interaction terms between the density
of physicians and dispensing variables in equation (9). The results are discussed in the
following section 3.2 together with other ndings.
For the estimation of equation (9) we have quarterly data for the dependent variable -
per capita antibiotic use - and for one independent variable - the price of a daily dose -,
whereas for the remaining explanatory variables only yearly data are available.21 Therefore,
we resolve to estimate equation (9) on a quarterly basis. A summary statistics of variables
used in the empirical analysis is provided in Table 2.
The correct econometric approach to the estimation of equation (9) has to deal with
three main issues: the possible endogeneity of price, the presence of unobserved heterogene-
ity variables, such as infection variables, and the possible spatial correlation of antibiotic
consumption across regions. Although the price of each antibiotic product does not vary
across geographic areas in Switzerland, the average price for a daily dose of antibiotics
di¤ers because geographic regions vary in the consumption mix of di¤erent antibiotic cat-
egories. Consequently, the price for a daily dose can be endogenous. Although both the
Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 2-test do not clearly reject the null
hypothesis of price exogeneity, we deal with this potential endogeneity problem by treating
the price as an endogenous variable and instrument it with the lagged value of price and
the exogenous regressors.
20To investigate the robustness of our estimations, we also considered alternative coding choices. A dummy
variable that takes value equal to 1 if there are dispensing practices in the area, and 0 otherwise, is used to
overcome the possible critique of setting an arbitrary threshold to 50%. The results are conrmed.
21 It is worh noting that the quarterly variation of most explanatory variables, such as income per capita
and demographic structure, is acually low.
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One additional argument that should be claried is the potential reverse causality be-
tween the presence of dispensing practices and the consumption of antibiotics. If areas with
a majority of dispensing practices are signicantly di¤erent in terms of antibiotic consump-
tion, we assume that causality runs from dispensing to antibiotic consumption. Although
regulators allow for dispensing because of need, there are at least two reasons why causality
cannot run from consumption to dispensing. First, the institutional decision to allow for
direct dispensing of antibiotics is not a short-run intervention. This relates to the structure
of the primary care market in di¤erent geographical areas, which is relatively stable over
time, and, consequently, can be treated as exogenous as with respect to the consumption
of antibiotics. Second, in Switzerland, the decision to allow for direct dispensing is not a
federal competence. Regional regulators independently decide on the organization of the
primary care market. Direct dispensing of drugs requires parliament approval, that is a
national law has to be passed and is subject to a referendum.
With regard to choice of the econometric approach, we decided to follow a two step
approach. In the rst stage, we used classical non spatial econometric models for panel
data, whereas in the second stage, we applied spatial panel data models.
It should be noted that in the econometric literature on panel data, we can nd var-
ious types of models. Generally, we can distinguish the following estimators: the OLS,
the between (BE), the xed e¤ects (FE) and the random e¤ects (RE).22 To account for
unobserved heterogeneity, the best approaches are to econometrically specify the model
(12) with either market area-specic xed e¤ects (FE) or with market area-specic random
e¤ects (RE).
FE models lend themselves well to situations with unobserved characteristics that re-
main relatively stable over time. RE models do not impose that heterogeneity be approxi-
mately constant within a unit over time, but have another important limitation. Specically,
they assume that the state-specic individual e¤ects are assumed to be uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables. In practice, the state-specic term may contain unobserved fac-
tors that are correlated with the explanatory variables. If so, the resulting RE coe¢ cients
are biased. By contrast, the preferred estimation technique with FE, yields unbiased es-
timated coe¢ cients even in the presence of such correlations. In order to choose between
the xed-e¤ects model and the random-e¤ects model we applied the Hausman test. This
test checks the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the individual-specic
22For a detailed presentation of the econometric methods that have been used to analyses panel data,
Greene (2008) and Baltagi (2006).
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error terms are uncorrelated. The result of the test shows that the di¤erences in coe¢ cients
between the two models are not systematic, thus implying that the random e¤ects model is
to be preferred. Moreover, the within variation of the majority of the variables included in
the model is low and this could imply a low statistical e¢ ciency of the xed e¤ects model.
Therefore, model (12) has been estimated using a RE model. Further, given the fact that
we are estimating model (12) using quarterly data where the majority of the explanatory
variables do not vary over time, we decided to use, for comparison purposes and to check
the robustness of the results, also the BE estimator. In this case, the estimation of model
(12) using quarterly data only for 2002 is equivalent to the estimation of model (12) using
cross-sectional data for 2002. Generally, the results are very similar to the random e¤ects
model and, therefore, we do not show them in the tables that report the empirical results.
As for spatial aspects, it is worth noting that regional antibiotic consumption may
be a¤ected by individuals and physicians attitudes towards antibiotic consumption as
well as the presence of infection disease in adjacent regions. The implications of spillover
e¤ects in antibiotic consumption have been recently investigated by González Ortiz and
Masiero (2013) using Italian data. Spatial externality problems can be taken into account
by means of adequate spatial econometrics estimators.23 To incorporate spatial e¤ects into
our regression model we can follow two approaches: the spatial-lag model and the spatial-
error model or, as proposed by Kapoor et al. (2007), an econometric model that combine
these two models. In this paper we adopt the random e¤ects spatial error and spatial lag
models.24 As suggested by Moscone and Knapp (2005), the spatial error model is relevant
when the distribution of residuals in di¤erent regions displays spatial correlation. Residual
may be spatially correlated if aggregated shocks hit regional health authorities or there are
unobservable risk factors concentrated across the areas. In our case, this e¤ect may be due,
for instance, to an infectious disease breakdown spreading across the country.
We expect the spatial error coe¢ cient to be positive, because infectious disease break-
down in the neighbourhood of area j will determine an increase of antibiotic consumption
23For a general introduction and discussion of spatial econometrics, see Anselin (1988, 2001). For an
application of spatial econometric methods in health economics see Moscone and Knapp (2005), Moscone,
Knapp and Tosetti (2007), Costa-Font and Moscone (2008), Filippini et. al. (2009a, 2009b).
24 In order to test the presence of spatial autocorrelation we considered several preliminary tests. The
Morans I statistic as described by Kelejian and Prucha (2001) were applied to check for spatial correlation
in the residuals. We also employed the testing procedure described in Baltagi et al. (2007). Both tests
reject the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the residuals at 1% signicance level (p-value 0.01). In
order to test for spatial correlation in the dependent variable, we applied the test described in Baltagi and
Long (2008). The test rejects the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the dependent variable at less
than 5% signicance level (p-value = 0.018).
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in the area. On the other side, we expect the spatial lag coe¢ cient to be negative, because
of the presence of spatial spillovers. A general increase of the consumption of antibiotics in
a neighborhood area decreases the need to consume antibiotics because the probability of
contagions decreases.
The econometric specication of the RE model for panel data with J cross-sectional
units observed over T time periods including spatial e¤ects, also referred as SARAR model
and proposed by Kapoor et al. (2007), is dened as
DID =   (W 
 IT ) DID +X   + u (10)
u =   (M 
 IT )  u+ " (11)
" = 
 eT +  (12)
where DID is a Jx1 vector of observations on antibiotic consumption per capita; X is the
JxQ matrix of explanatory variables;  is the vector of regression parameters; W and M
are the matrix of spatial weights; u is a vector of spatially lagged residuals;  is a vector
of individual e¤ects and  is a vector of i.i.d. residuals; nally  and  are the spatial lag
and spatial error respectively.
Concerning ", following assumptions are made:
" = 
 eT + v (13)
E() = 0 (14)
E(  0) = 2  IJ (15)
E(v) = 0 (16)
E(v  v0) = 2v  IJT (17)
E(v0  (
 eT )) = 0 (18)
where  is a (Jx1) vector of individual (random) e¤ects with zero mean, zero covariance
and variance 2. Further, j and jt are i.i.d. with nite fourth moments. It is assumed
that the matrices IJ   W and IJ   M are invertible (non-singular) and that ,  are
bounded in absolute value.
As expected the Wu-Hausman F-test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the
spatially lagged dependent variable at less than 0.1% signicance level. To deal with en-
dogeneity, we also treat the spatially lagged dependent variable as endogenous, together
with price, and instrument it with the spatially lagged exogenous regressors and lagged
price. Note that we can only use three quarters for our estimations since the lagged price
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is included as an instrument. First-stage regressions on the instruments yield signicant
joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not reject the null
hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
For the estimation of the spatial econometric models above we follow the approach
suggested by Kapoor et al. (2007), and use a generalized moment estimator. Moreover,
since current STATA commands do not combine the estimation of spatial-lag and spatial-
error models, we developed additional STATA codes to estimate our models.
3.2 Estimation results
Before focusing on the e¤ect of dispensing practices, we briey summarize the main results
from the estimation of equation (9) using the random e¤ects model with and without spatial
error and spatial lag e¤ects described by (10)-(12). In Table 3 we report the parameter
estimates obtained using the random e¤ects models that do not consider spatial e¤ects.
Models with spatial e¤ects are summarized in Table 4. Further, we report the results
obtained using the two approaches to account for dispensing practices in separate columns.
In the rst column we show the results with the dummy variable approach, whereas in the
second column a continuous dispensing variable is considered.
Generally, the value of the parameters and the number of signicant parameters in
spatial models are relatively close to those reported for the non spatial models. When
we take spatial e¤ects into account, the values of the income parameters are higher than
the values reported in Table 3. Further, in both spatial models the age structure of the
population seems to have a lower impact on the per capita antibiotic sales than in models
without spatial e¤ects.
To provide more details on the estimated parameters, we start by looking at the e¤ect of
income. Income elasticity varies between 0:13 (non-spatial models, not signicant) and 0:27
(spatial models, signicant at less than 5%), which supports the hypothesis that antibiotics
are normal goods.25 Our result is in accordance with other ndings in the literature (Nilson
and Laurell, 2005; Henricson et al.,1998; Thrane et al., 2003).
Concerning the impact of the age structure of the population on antibiotic consumption
we can observe that only young and elderly people seem to have a clear impact. A higher
proportion of children between 0 and 14 years of age increases antibiotic consumption in
an area. Conversely, antibiotics are less likely to be prescribed in areas that have a larger
25Baye et al. (1997) nd higher income elasticity (1.33) that may be related to di¤erences in the population
under study and the type of antibiotics considered (only penicillins and tetracyclines).
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proportion of individuals who are over 74 years of age compared to the baseline class.26
In all model specications the coe¢ cient of the incidence of infections exhibits the
expected positive sign but is poorly signicant.
The values of price elasticity of antibiotics obtained in the between model are close to
the estimates of Baye et al. (1997), who found negative compensated ( 0:785) and uncom-
pensated ( 0:916) own-price e¤ects for anti-infectives. Ellison et al. (1997) calculate price
elasticities irrespective of drug (cephalosporins) expenditure using US wholesales data from
1985 to 1991. Their estimates range between  0:38 and  4:34. Our estimated price elas-
ticities range between 0:14 (non-spatial models, not signicant) to  0:55 (spatial models,
signicant). The coe¢ cient on price of doctor consultations is not signicant. Although
expensive consultations imply higher diagnosis e¤ort, which may reduce inappropriate pre-
scriptions of antibiotics, this hypothesis is not conrmed by our results.
The physiciansdensity is positively and signicantly associated with local per capita
antibiotic use. Estimated elasticities vary between 0:08 and 0:13. Similarly, an increase in
the density of pharmacies leads to higher levels of per capita outpatient antibiotic use in
the area. The estimated coe¢ cient ranges between 0:61 and 0:69.
As for the impact of direct dispensing of drugs, the results reported in Table 4 for
spatial models conrm the results reported in 3. We nd that the proportion of practices
without dispensing (NODISP ) has a negative e¤ect on antibiotic sales in both models,
although the coe¢ cient is not signicant. Consequently, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that areas without dispensing practices and areas with a relatively small proportion of
dispensing practices (below 50%) exhibit similar levels of antibiotic consumption per capita.
However, when the proportion of dispensing practices is relatively high (more than 50%),
the e¤ect on consumption is positive and signicant. The estimated coe¢ cients suggest that
in market areas where the proportion of dispensing practices is relatively high, antibiotic
consumption is 1:30 to 1:37 times higher than in the other market areas, respectively for
non spatial and spatial model specications. This e¤ect is conrmed by the results obtained
using a continuous variable representing the share of dispensing practices in each market
areas.27 The value of the estimated price elasticity varies between 0:58 and 0:68 and is
highly signicant. This value suggests that a one percent increase in the proportion of
26Similar results are obtained, for instance, by Mousquès et al. (2003), who investigate a panel of general
practitioners prescribing antibiotics for rhynopharingeal infections.
27 Interaction terms between the density of physicians and dispensing variables are always insignicant,
both in spatial and non-spatial regressions. This is somehow expected since the density of physicians and
dispensing covariates are highly signicant. Most of the variation is then captured by these variables included
separately and little is left for their interaction.
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dispensing practices will increase the per capita antibiotic sales by 0:58% to 0:68%.
The estimates of the spatial error coe¢ cient () and the estimates of the spatial lag
coe¢ cient () are statistically signicant and carry the expected sign.28 The positive spatial
error coe¢ cient may suggest that unobservable aspects or random shocks, such as a disease
outbreak in surrounding areas, will determine an increase of antibiotic consumption in
area i. Other more deterministic spatial spillovers are captured by the negative spatial
lag coe¢ cient. In this case an increase in the consumption of antibiotics in neighborhood
areas decreases antibiotic consumption in area i. This may indicate that the probability of
contagions decreases due to the preventive e¤ect of antibiotic consumption.
It is worth noticing that the negative correlation between the rate of dispensing practices
and the density of pharmacies in the areas is remarkable. One could then argue that
dispensing practices are meant to improve access to drugs when pharmacies are lacking.
Note, however, that in our model specications we control for access in general. Indeed,
the estimated coe¢ cient for dispensing practices is adjusted for the density of pharmacies
as well as for the density of all practices. This suggests that direct dispensing of drugs may
increase antibiotic consumption beyond the levels usually attained by some satisfactory
access to medical services. One could also argue that the density of pharmacies is not a
good indicator for access to antibiotic treatment in the area. Indeed, travelling costs for
patients may vary consistently. Consider, for instance, two small areas of the same size but
di¤erent number of pharmacies and inhabitants. The two areas may have the same number
of pharmacies per inhabitant, i.e. the same density. However, the average patients distance
from the pharmacy may di¤er. To address this point we run separate regressions with the
density of the population as an additional regressor. This allows to better captures the
level of urbanization of the areas and, consequently, can be used as a proxy for travelling
distances. The variable is never signicant, nor does it change the results of the other
covariates signicantly. We are then condent that our estimates of the e¤ect of dispensing
practices on antibiotic consumption is quite robust to any possible misspecication related
to access to medical treatment.
4 Conclusions
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are important aspects of access to primary health care.
In most developed countries, these aspects are kept separate and doctors are not allowed
28To investigate the robustness of these results we also estimate spatial lag models and a spatial error
models separately. The estimates conrm the results reported in Table 4.
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to sell drugs directly to their patients. The separation of prescribing drugs and dispensing
drugs has recently proved to be e¤ective in reducing drug expenditure, for instance in
Taiwan (Chou et al., 2003). However, the separation of drug prescribing and dispensing
may be costly in terms of limited access to drug treatment and low levels of infection
prevention. In Switzerland, physicians are allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients in
most cantons, with some exceptions across the country.
In this paper, we investigated dispensing practices using a theoretical and an empiri-
cal approach. For this purpose, we extended the classical Hotelling product di¤erentiation
model (Hotelling, 1929; Gravelle, 1999) with horizontal and vertical dimensions. We al-
lowed for di¤erent types of general practitioners (with and without direct dispensing),
imperfect information on the nature of patients infection (viral or bacterial), and positive
and negative externalities from antibiotic consumption. GPs we allowed to reduce errors
in prescribing by increasing the level of diagnostic services provided to their patients. We
showed that the interaction between consumption externalities and incentives to dispens-
ing practices may reduce diagnosis accuracy and, consequently, increase the likelihood of
antibiotic prescriptions.
Using data on antibiotic consumption from small geographical areas from a country
(Switzerland) with a fee-for-service remuneration scheme for doctors and two prescribing
regimes - with and without dispensing practices -, we examined the e¤ects of dispensing
practices empirically. Our econometric approach relies on spatial models for panel data
where spatial aspects (both spatial lag and spatial error e¤ects) of infectious diseases and
antibiotic consumption are taken into account by appropriate spatial-econometrics estima-
tors (Moscone et al., 2007; Moscone and Tosetti, 2010a). Findings indicate that dispensing
practices induce higher rates of antibiotic use, after controlling for patient characteristics,
epidemiological factors, and access to drug treatment.
The rationale behind a higher consumption of antibiotics under a dispensing regime
may be that dispensing practices benet more from antibiotic prescriptions because they
gain a margin from antibiotic sales. This leads to lower diagnosis e¤ort which increases
mistaken diagnosis and, consequently, raises antibiotic prescriptions and reduces antibiotic
e¤ectiveness (higher bacterial resistance). This e¤ect is probably only partially mitigated
by the positive externality from antibiotic consumption that reduce prescriptions needed
by other individuals and in following periods. There will be scope for additional incentives
to dispensing practices to reduce the inappropriate use of antibiotics and contain the threat
of bacterial resistance.
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Figure 1: Doctors strategies to tacke a mild respiratory/gastro-intestinal infection.
Infection Prescription Cost of di¤erent treatments strategies
v NA f + tdj
v A (f + z) + tdj
b A (f + z) + tdj
b NA+A 2 (f + tdj) + z
Table 1: The total cost of treatment depends upon doctors prescription strategy
(A=antibiotics, NA=antipyretic/anti-inammatory only) and the type of patients infec-
tion (b=bacterial, v=viral).
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Figure 2: Outpatient antibiotic use across small areas in Switzerland (year 2002), measured
in dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants (DID).
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Figure 3: Proportion of dispensing practices among all GP practices across small geographic
areas in Switzerland (year 2002).
31
Variable Description Mean Std dev.
DID Dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants 11.714 13.061
Y Income per capita dened in CHF 23465 6849.4
POP1 Proportion of 0-14 in total population 0.1658 0.0243
POP2 Proportion of 15-25 in total population 0.1247 0.0173
POP3 Proportion of 26-59 in total population 0.4956 0.0314
POP4 Proportion of 60-74 in total population 0.1363 0.0213
POP5 Proportion of over 74 in total population 0.0776 0.0190
INF Incidence of common gastrointestinal infections 114.69 22.580
(salmonella and campylobacter) in 100000 inhabitants
DPHY Density of physicians for 100000 inhabitants 565.21 1052.5
DPHA Density of pharmacies for 100000 inhabitants 35.098 39.112
PA Price of a dened daily dose 3.7112 0.3113
PC Price of GP consultations 0.9074 0.0526
DBOR Whether or not the area borders other countries 0.125 0.0107
DLAT Whether an area has a Latin (French and Italian) 0.4375 0.0160
or a German culture
DHOS Whether or not there is at least one hospital in the area 0.7417 0.0141
NODISP Whether or not there are no dispensing practices 0.4083 0.0159
in the area
DISP50 Whether or not there is a majority of dispensing 0.2333 0.0137
practices in the area
DISP % of dispensing practices across all practices in the area 0.2187 0.0100
Table 2: Variables notation and summary statistics.
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Random-e¤ects IV regressions
Dispensing dummies Continous dispensing variable
Number of obs. 720 720
Number of groups 240 240
R2 within 0.6599 0.6545
R2 between 0.7369 0.7497
R2 overall 0.7333 0.7452
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -2.198744 1.427119 0.123 -3.024184 1.437677 0.035
Y 0.1341392 0.1086522 0.217 0.1494742 0.1065245 0.161
POP1 0.7770858 0.2902369 0.007 0.707528 0.2854014 0.013
POP2 -0.3992381 0.2628232 0.129 -0.4388904 0.258685 0.090
POP4 -0.0832129 0.2108611 0.693 -0.1966698 0.2121132 0.354
POP5 -0.2448346 0.1039692 0.019 -0.2192098 0.1017727 0.031
INF 0.0146288 0.0420017 0.728 0.0329257 0.0410286 0.422
DPHY 0.1271244 0.0340157 0.000 0.1181553 0.0334417 0.000
DPHA 0.6092891 0.0513577 0.000 0.6456287 0.0515961 0.000
PA 0.1435792 0.7619403 0.851 0.192503 0.817172 0.814
PC 0.2545297 0.4248651 0.549 0.3310219 0.4261601 0.437
DBOR -0.0001904 0.0583645 0.997 0.0076729 0.0560429 0.891
DLAT -0.0618509 0.0921805 0.502 -0.034946 0.0872025 0.689
DHOSP -0.0006248 0.0560705 0.991 -0.0011009 0.0554195 0.984
NODISP -0.0441112 0.0614449 0.473
DISP50 0.2993839 0.0602715 0.000
DISP 0.5856185 0.0938454 0.000
dt2 -0.1982564 0.0143699 0.000 -0.1974589 0.015179 0.000
dt3 -0.1824587 0.0149339 0.000 -0.1816195 0.0157927 0.000
 0.25347992 0.24544706
 0.07584716 0.07584716
2 due to i 0.91782296 0.91283258
Notes: The instruments used in the random-e¤ects IV regressions (RE2SLS) are the lagged variable of
price (PAt 1), Yt, POP1t, POP2t, POP4t, POP5t, INFt, DPHYt, DPHAt, PCt, DBORt, DLATt, DHOSPt,
NODISPt, DISP50t (DISPt in the continous variable regression), dt2, and dt3. First-stage regressions on the
instruments yield signicant joint F-tests.
Table 3: Parameter estimates of random-e¤ects IV regressions (RE2SLS).
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Spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions
Dispensing dummies Continous dispensing variable
Number of obs. 720 720
Number of groups 240 240
R2 within 0.4055 0.4076
R2 between 0.7921 0.8005
R2 overall 0.7839 0.7923
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -0.5600248 0.7059426 0.428 -0.931256 0.6927078 0.179
Y 0.2506859 0.1172455 0.033 0.2670415 0.1139665 0.019
POP1 0.4642093 0.267977 0.083 0.4615374 0.2614212 0.077
POP2 -0.349267 0.2318164 0.132 -0.4088315 0.2255809 0.070
POP4 -0.1101778 0.1879261 0.558 -0.1769792 0.1842804 0.337
POP5 -0.2025597 0.0939734 0.031 -0.1504447 0.0928847 0.105
INF 0.0072868 0.0549224 0.894 0.0310215 0.0539316 0.565
DPHY 0.0788513 0.027162 0.004 0.0768944 0.0264956 0.004
DPHA 0.6536462 0.0468989 0.000 0.6916768 0.0469933 0.000
PA -0.5476143 0.3067118 0.074 -0.4935378 0.3062494 0.107
PC 0.0614923 0.4785733 0.898 0.1189752 0.4670196 0.799
DBOR 0.0275946 0.0605708 0.649 0.0554975 0.0593344 0.350
DLAT 0.0678903 0.0898894 0.450 0.1175204 0.0818143 0.151
DHOSP 0.0100526 0.0462533 0.828 0.0089593 0.0451583 0.843
NODISP 0.0075422 0.0545024 0.890
DISP50 0.3738889 0.0632064 0.000
DISP 0.6853876 0.0992924 0.000
dt2 -0.1355012 0.0108294 0.000 -0.1326363 0.0107027 0.000
dt3 -0.1270158 0.0104178 0.000 -0.1242904 0.0103106 0.000
 -0.3537783 0.0891222 0.000 -0.3323822 0.0871533 0.000
 0.5346576 0.0534699 0.063 0.5346576 0.0534699 0.063
 0.23122444 0.22573567
 0.070791 0.070791
2due to i 0.91430063 0.91046009
Notes: The instruments used in the spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions (SRE2SLS) are the lagged vari-
able of price (PAt 1), Yt, POP1t, POP2t, POP4t, POP5t, INFt, DPHYt, DPHAt, PCt, DBORt, DLATt,
DHOSPt, NODISPt, DISP50t (DISPt in the continous variable regression), dt2, dt3, and their spatial lags.
First-stage regressions on the instruments yield signicant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test
statistics does not reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid.
Table 4: Parameter estimates of spatial random-e¤ects IV regressions (SRE2SLS).
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